BLE Proximity Verification

Proximity verification uses Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE) to verify credentials in face-to-face scenarios, following the ISO 18013-5 standard. The holder presents a QR code containing device engagement data, the verifier scans it and establishes a BLE connection, then the credential is transferred and verified locally.

Flow overview

The proximity exchange itself (device engagement, BLE session, DeviceRequest/DeviceResponse) happens entirely between the verifier app and the holder's wallet, per ISO 18013-5. The backend's role is a single endpoint, POST /proximity/verify, that cryptographically verifies the DeviceResponse your app received.

1. Device engagement

The holder's wallet displays a QR code containing the ISO 18013-5 device engagement (CBOR encoded as a URI). Your verifier app scans it to extract:

• The BLE UUID for the connection
• The holder's ephemeral public key (for session encryption)

Keep the raw device engagement bytes: they are required later for the session transcript.

2. BLE connection

After scanning, the wallet and verifier establish a BLE connection:

1. Service discovery: The verifier connects to the BLE service UUID from the engagement.
2. Session establishment: Both sides derive a shared session key using HKDF over their ephemeral ECDH keys.
3. Encrypted transfer: The credential response is encrypted with AES-256-GCM and transferred over BLE.

All BLE communication is encrypted end-to-end. The session keys are ephemeral and never reused.

3. Submit the response

Once your app receives the BLE data, forward it to the backend for cryptographic verification.

POST /proximity/verify

Authentication: API key (publishable or secret)

POST /proximity/verify
Authorization: Bearer oat_your_publishable_key
Content-Type: application/json

{
  "deviceResponse": "omdkb2N1bWVudHOh...",
  "sessionTranscript": {
    "deviceEngagementBytes": "pGpEZXZpY2VFbmdhZ2VtZW50...",
    "eReaderKeyBytes": "pAECIAEhWCA..."
  }
}

There is no request ID: the endpoint is stateless and everything needed for verification is in the body. Both parts of sessionTranscript are required; the endpoint returns 400 if either is missing.

Response 200

{
  "status": "valid",
  "verification": {
    "ISSUER_AUTH": [
      { "status": "✅", "check": "Issuer certificate must be valid" },
      { "status": "✅", "check": "The MSO must be valid at the time of verification" }
    ],
    "DEVICE_AUTH": [
      { "status": "✅", "check": "Device signature must be valid" }
    ]
  },
  "presentation": {
    "eu.europa.ec.eudi.pid.1": {
      "given_name": "Marie",
      "family_name": "Dupont",
      "portrait": "..."
    }
  }
}

Check statuses are ✅ (passed) or 🛑 (failed).

Error responses

Proximity-specific checks

Beyond the standard mDoc verification (issuer signature, certificate chain, device binding), proximity verification adds:

Reader authentication (RICAL)

When the verifier acts as an mDoc reader (sending a DeviceRequest to a wallet over proximity), the wallet may verify the reader's identity by checking the readerAuth certificate chain against a RICAL (Reader Identification CA List, ISO/IEC 18013-5 second edition Annex F).

A RICAL is a signed COSE list of CA certificates that are trusted to issue mDoc reader certificates within a given ecosystem (e.g. France Titres' driving-licence reader PKI). The wallet loads a RICAL out-of-band, then on every inbound proximity request:

1. Parses the readerAuth from the DeviceRequest.
2. Validates the COSE_Sign1 signature on the reader cert.
3. Builds the cert chain from the leaf up to a CA listed in the RICAL.
4. If no anchor matches, the wallet shows the request as "Reader not trusted" (the user may still consent; RICAL is informational, not blocking).

If the wallet has no RICAL configured, it falls back to first-edition behaviour: signature is verified but chain trust is skipped.

For verifier integrators

To have your reader cert validate on wallets that consume a given RICAL:

• Register your reader CA with the ecosystem operator (e.g. France Titres for the FR mDL test event).
• Once published, wallets that load that RICAL will see your reader as trusted.
• No code change on the verifier side: the reader cert is what already travels in your readerAuth.

The Verifiables wallet exposes a "Reader Trust (RICAL)" entry in Settings → Connectivity to load the active RICAL by URL.

Use cases

• Age verification at point of sale: Verify age_over_18 without collecting personal data
• Identity checks at reception: Verify visitor identity with portrait comparison
• Access control: Verify employee credentials at building entry points
• Document inspection: Law enforcement or border control identity verification

Implementation notes

• BLE transfer supports payloads up to ~512 KB, sufficient for credentials with portrait images.
• The BLE connection timeout is 30 seconds. If the transfer is not completed, the session expires.
• For mobile verifier apps, the BLE proximity module handles connection management. See the SDK documentation for integration details.